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The reception of the economic torts into 
New Zealand labour law: a preliminary 
discussion 
Gordon Anderson* 
This discussion raises a nu1nberojissues related to the introduction of the econonzic torts into Nev.' 
Zealand labour law during the 1970s. These include the question of whether such tnajor innovations 
accorded with !he principles nonnally accepted by conzparative lal-1:vers when considering legal 
transplants. and the basic queslion of whether the co nun on law as developed in Britain is. in this case. 
suitable for New Z ealand circunJStances. The inzpact of the law in New Zealand is then outlined and 
the changes introduced hy the Labour Relations Act are briefly considered. 
Introduction 
The award of$1 .66 million in dan1ages to the Ford Motor Co Ltd in the recent case of Ford 
Motor Co Ltd v Northern Storepersons IUW( 19H7). although shortlived. did focus attention on the 
potential impact that the common law economic torts could have for labour law and industrial 
relations in New Zealand. The scheme of the Labour Relations Act 19X7 also makes the 
application of these torts in New Zealand labour law of renewed importance as they have now 
gained the imprin1atur of statutory recognition and have become one of the two sanctions 
against unlawful industrial action and arguably by far the most effective of the remedies 
available to an employer to utilise if recourse is to be had to the law as a means of settling or 
combating strikes. 
The one 4uestion that does not seen1 to have been seriously considered either in the 17 years 
since the common law was first utilised in 1970. or during the debate leading up to the l9X7 
labour law reforms is whether or not such an in1portant aspect of New Zealand's industrial 
relations system should be governed hy a system of law that has been developed in the very 
different environment of the United Kingdom and by a judiciary that had no reason to 
contemplate its effect in New Zealand. and who. even if the thought had occurred. would 
almost certainly have acted no differently. 
Legal transplants 
Comparative lawyers have long recognised that the transplantation of the elements of one 
country·s legal system to that of another can cause difficulties for the recipient's legal system. 
For this reason caution and careful evaluation have been urged before any such transplant is 
carried out. A significant exception to this rule however. has been the reception of English 
common law throughout much of the Comn1onwealth. It seems to have been assumed that this 
law will remain compatible with the different political and social systems that make up the 
common law world and that local courts can make such adjustments as are necessary to 
accommodate peculiar local conditions. In most cases this has proved to be true. hut in general 
it has also been the case that the common law arrived with the colonists of the various common 
law countries who largely adopted English law in its totality. Developments in the con1 n1on law 
have thus been integrated into the local legal systen1 as the local system itself developed taking 
the common law changes into account. 
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The question that is raised by the introduction of the common law economic torts into New 
Zealand's labour law is whether an area of law that has developed in a direction quite different 
from that ofBritain. and over the same time period. can readily receive a transplant of common 
law rules that have been developed essentially in the context of the British industrial relations 
system and in a foreign political and legal environment. It is suggested in this discussion that 
the reception of the economic torts into New Zealand's labour law should have been subjected 
to the same critical analysis that would have been expected of any other substantial legal 
change and that the principles that would apply to a statutory transplant are equally applicable 
to such a major change brought about by the courts through the application of the common 
law. 
Problems with transplants 
Warnings on the dangers of comparative work in labour law and industrial relations are 
not uncommon. Kassalow ( 1968) for exa mple has said : 
Without a fair unders tanding of the social economic and political setting of the industrial 
relations system in a given coun try one can make e rrors of analysis or judgment. or. even 
more likely. lea rn on ly half truths about the significance of particular industrial relations 
policies or practices in foreign countries. ( 196X. p. 99). 
Sch regie ( 19X I) has discussed the pitfalls of con1 parativc studies in some deta i I and in 
particular draws attention to the issue of whether that which is being compared is in fact 
coo1parablc. One particular danger he points out is that superficial sirnilarities may be 
misleading and that the use of comn1on terminology can conceal considerable variations in 
the underlying concepts and practices. This point is particularly valid in comparing LOmn1on 
law rules where the tern1inology and concepts ren1ain con~tant from country to country even 
though the underlying social system that supported the derivation of a concept n1ay he quite 
different. 
One of the leading con1parative lawyers of recent tinh~s. Professor Kahn-Frcund. has 
addressed the specific prohlcn1 of lega l transplants in labour law in an article. nan1ed appro-
priately On uses and nlL\·ues ojcon1parative law ( Kahn-Freu nd. 1974). Kahn-Freund argued that 
the task of tran splanting hccon1cs n1ore difficult as power relationships hecorne n1orc dorn-
inant: 
But then~ is a third political clement. and in many ways from a practical point ofvicw the 
most important. It is the enormously increased role which is played hy organised interests in 
the making and in the maintenance of legal institutions. Anyone contemplating the usc of 
foreign legislation for law making in his country must ask himself: how far does this rule or 
institution owe its existence or its continued existenl:e to a distribution of power in the 
foreign country that we do not share'! H ow far would it be accepted and how far rejected hy 
the organised groups which. in the political sense are part of our constitution'! ( 1974. p. 
12) 
These questions. while addressed to those conternplating legislative transplants. could 
equally have been addressed to those judges seeking to introduce rnajor changes through the 
common law. Kahn-Freund stresses the perhaps obv ious fact that collective industrial rela-
tions in particular arc closely linked with the structure of socia l and political power in their 
own particular cnvironrnent. His discussion was n1adc in the particular context of the Indus-
trial Relations Act llJ71 (UK) and he attributes rna ny of the failures of that Act to the failure of 
the govcrnrnent to appreciate the significant structural and legal differences between the 
United States and Britain which rnadc the introduction of the n1orc forn1al and legalis tic 
United States rnodels inappropriate. 
Kahn-Freund's vie\\~ have however been challenged. particularly by Watson ( 1976). Wat-
so n argues that succes~fultransplants depend not or1 the power structure oft he donor cou ntl)' 
hut on that of th e recipient and he states: 
What, in my opinion. the law reformer should he after in looking at foreign systems was an 
ulea which could he transformed into part of the law of his coun try. For this a sys tema tic 
knowledge of the law or political ~tructure oft he donor ystem was not ncccessary .... ( 1976. 
p. 79 ) 
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\Vatson doe · not however advocate uninformed transplants: he rather places a different 
emphasis on the country that should he studied to ensure the viahility of the transplant. In 
countering Kahn- Fn:u nd's ex arn ple of the Industrial Relations Act. Watson hlan1es its failures 
not on its United States origins hut on the power structure in British industry. 
The particular point to be derived from the introduction of the economic torts into New 
Zealand's labour law is that not only were the considerations outlined above unheeded hut 
they Jo not sc~rn even to have been considered as particularly relevant, such is the n1ystique of 
the universa l applicability of the cornn1on law. 
The reception ofco/Jlnton law into New Zealand 
The ~xtent to which the New Zealand courts can regulate the transmission of the common 
law a developed outside New Zealand or rnodify it for New Zealand conditions is a question 
that. in rec~nt tin1cs. has hecon1e sornewhat controversial. In a recent discussion of the 
position. McHugh ( llJ~7) argues that the local courts have only a lin1itcd ahility to develop the 
law in a way uni~ue to New Zealand. On the has is of a recent Privy Council decision. Hart,, 
O'Connor ( IYX5) McHugh concludes: 
There i~ onl) a di~tinct. uni4ue ··New Zealand common law" in those matters where our 
"local circum~tan ccs" ~et us apart from other common law jurisdictions ... Do we think it 
right our Judges should ha\C to prove their view of"local circumstances" to a tribunal in 
London? ( 19S7. pp. 27-28) 
The prefer~nce of th~ Priv) Council for English law was also n1ade clear in a decision 
su bscq uen t to Hart " 0 'Connor. In Tai Hing Col/on Mill Ltd'' Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd ( 19R5) the 
Privy Co uncil ~ aid: 
It i~ 0 r COLI r~c open to I he .f lJ d icial Corn rn i ttee to depart from a House of Lords decbion in a 
case\\ here. h) n:a~on of cu~torn or statute or for other reasons peculiar to the jurisdiction 
where the matter in dispute arose. the Ju dicial Committee is re4uircd to determine whether 
English law ~hould ot should not apply. (p. Y5~) 
The Judicial Cornrnitte~ \V~nt on to justify its decision in Hart v O'Connor on the hasis that 
.. the duty oft h~ New Zea Ian d Court oft\ ppea I was not to depart frorn ... the settled pri nci pic of 
law". 
These decision~ ~t:ern to heavily ljlla I i fy the ex tent of the discretion that th~ New Zealand 
courts have to depart frorn ··English·· law and it would seen1 that until app~ab to the Privy 
Council are abolished NC\\ Zealand law will he forced to devt:lop in the shadow oft he English 
con1mon Ia\\ . The oun ofAppeal has however dernonstrated a willingness to depart fron1 the 
comn1on law on ~orne occasions when it helieves that significant differences exist in N~w 
Zealand LOnditions. One clear t:Xan1pk in labour law was in North Island J,Vholesale Grocerie.s 
Luh• Hewin ( 1982) where th~ English rul~s on taking account of tax in cornputing da1nagcs were 
held to be inappropriate in New Zealand. 
In the cas~s introducing the econon1ic torts into New Zealand Ia hour law the question of 
local circu1nstances did not arise and it is only recently that the courts se~n1 to have considered 
then1 (.111 issue. Even had the question arisen. however. ther~ would se~n1 to be only lirnited 
roon1 for an independ~nt d~vcloprnent of the law. should th~ courts have chosen to pursue 
such a devt:loprnenl. As is discussed below. an) chang~ in the econon1ic torts to adapt to 
industrial co nOict would aln1ost certainly need to go to the root of their underlying prin-
ci pies. 
The development of New Zealand and British strike law 
\Vh en New Zealand adopted a systern ofcornpulsory conciliation and arbitration in 1894 
labour law in the t\VO cou ntri~s began to diverge and to develop on quite different patterns and 
with quite clifft:rent philosophies of the role of law in industrial relations. The New Zealand 
~yste rn is one that derives all of its essential forrn fron1 its statutory base: the bargaining systen1 
ts laid down hy sta tute. unions derive hoth their existence and legal status largely fron1 statute 
and th e enforcctncnt oft he sys tcn1 is laid down by statute. The law. and in particular statutory 
law. permeates the whole sys tcn1 while the con1n1on law has been largely peripheral. 
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By contrast the British system of industrial relations has been characterised as one of legal 
abstentionisn1. Its procedures. its organisation and its practices have been developed by the 
parties largely without government intervention and it is only in the last two decades that 
statutory intervention has assumed major importance. Until recently the major intervention 
by statute was intended to protect the industrial relations system from the potentially deva-
stating intrusion of the common law. 
A point that should be kept in mind is that the development of British strike law was 
conten1poraneous with that in New Zealand. In moving to its statute-based arbitration system 
New Zealand did not displace a matured system of common law rules. In 1894 the common law 
had only just began to develop a response to the emergence of industrial unionism. In 1894 it 
was less than 20 years since British unions had gained protection from the criminal law of 
conspiracy and the cases defining the liability of unions in tort for strike action had yet to be 
decided. The con1n1on law as it affects strikes is not only a peculiarly British development and a 
reaction to British circun1stances but it is an area oflaw that entirely postdates the separation of 
New Zealand's law fron1 that of Britain. 
Strike law in Ne·w Zealand 
In l X94 the New Zealand legislature passed the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
which signalled a n1ajor break with not only the British pattern of industrial relations but also 
with its law governing industrial relations. In the period since IX94 New Zealand has evolved 
tts own systen1 oflaw and practice to deal with the problems of industrial conflict. For most of 
this period strikes have been proscribed by statute but after the problems of enforcing anti-
~trike law were den1onstrated during the 1908 Blackball strike. the attempt to enforce legal 
~anctions against individual strikes or strikers was gradually abandoned. An acceptance or at 
least tolerance ofstri kes developed with state sanctions being reserved for significant threats to 
the systern such as occurred in 1912-13 and 1951. 
When concern with the numberofstrikes emerged in the 1960s the solution was seen not in 
tenns of penal rneasures hut in in1proved procedures to enable the peaceful settlement of 
industrial disputes. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970 intro-
duced sin1ple procedures for the settletnent of disputes of rights and set up the mediation 
service to aid peaceful settlen1ents. reforn1s that were consolidated in the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973. In 1976 however penalties were reintroduced into the Act by the National Govcrn-
tnent. The final act in the saga of crin1inal sanctions for strikes came in 1977-7S when the 
lessons of Blackball were learned again in the Ocean Beach prosecution debacle (see Walsh. 
19X3). The subsequent [)unlop Report( 1978) recon1n1ended that all strike penalties be made a 
civil matter. a recommendation that was speedily adopted in the Industrial Relations Amend-
ment Act l97X. 
It was in this decade. when statutory strike law was beginning to assume a rational form. 
that the cconon1ic torts rnade their entry into labour law and over the next decade and a half 
became an increasingly in1portant factor in many industrial conflicts. This development 
occurred n1oreoverwithout any real consideration of the nature of what was happening. In the 
period between 1970 and 19X7 the Court of Appca I has l:Onsidered the issue of economic torts in 
labour law only twice. both on interlocutory applications rather than full hearings. 
The Labour Relations Act 19X7 has continued the legislative trend of the 1970s and all 
direct penalties for striking have been rernovcd fron1 the Act. The ren1edies available to an 
employer arc either a con1pliance order or an action in tort for an injunction or damages or 
both. Thus, fron1 being outside the n1ainstrean1 of labour law in New Zealand. the economic 
torts have hecornc a centrepiece of the new legislation. The unanswered question ren1ains 
however: \vhat is the nature of this law and what is its suitability for New Zealand condi-
tio ns? 
Strike /ali' in Britain • 
To undcr~tand the con1n1on law econon1ic torts as they apply to industrial conflkt in the 
later par.t of thi s century one n1ust go back to developments in the period leading up to the 
Trade D ts pu tes Act 1906 (UK). In 1 R7 5, at the ti rne of the ren1oval of the last remnants of direct 
cri~inal penalties aga~~st ~ni?~s for striking. the n1odern economic torts barely existed. 
Thtrty years later the Bnttsh JUdtctary had developed the law to a position that threatened both 
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the effectivent: sand continued viability of the trade union rnoven1ent in Britain. Jenks ( l92R. 
p. 337) sun11ned up these developrnenb in ·aying that the judges .. first invented a new civil 
offence and ... then created a new kind of defendant against whon1 it could be alleged ... Clark 
& Wedderburn ( l9R3. p. 141) n1ake the point in a different way: .. in the face of corntnon law 
liabilities trade unions have no right to function or even to cxi~l".ln 1875 the only one of the 
econon1k torts to have clearly developed was inducen1ent to hreach of contract which was 
est a hlished in Lzunley v Gye ( 1 R53 ). The n1ajor developrncnts occu red in a trilogy of cases in the 
House of Lord ~ between 1R92 and 1901 1• and in the case of intitnidation. not until Rooke:~ v 
Barnard ( 1964 ). The response to these earlier developrnents. particularly after the T(~ff..Vale case. 
wa the cleveloprnent of the statutory in11nunities in the Trade Disputes Act 1906.2 This Act 
created a statutorv svstcrn of in1n1unities frorn at:tions in tort for activities carried out in the 
• r 
course of a trade dispute: the so-called .. golden forrnula .. that in various forrns has been the 
basis of British trade union viability ever since. 
The subsequent dcvcloprncnts in both the cornrnon law and in statute after 1906 arc \\'e ll 
known and will not be discussed here (see Elias & Ewing. 19R2 and Davies & Freedland. 1984a 
for a discussion oft he n1odern position). What is of interest for this discussion is the effect that 
these and su bse4 uent devclopn1en ts have had on the shape of the con1n1on law. It will be 
suggested that the rnodern con1n1on law is the result of a particular and peculiar set ofh istorical 
and ideological circurnstances uni4ue to Britain. and that as a conse4ucnce. this law n1ust be 
treated with great caution in any other legal systern. 
The srrucrure of Brirish strike law 
Modern British strike law consists oft\\'O distinct parts and without an appreciation of this 
the con1n1on law cannot he placed in its proper perspective. The t\VO parts are: 
(I) The con1111on law which. through the economic torts. contains a set of rules which in 
certain circurnstances render one person liable for econon1ic dan1age inllicted on 
another. The fact that these torts have developed largely in cases involving industrial 
conflict. and in an atrnosphere of judicial hostility both to unions and to industrial 
conflict has resulted in thoseca rryingout industrial action being particularly vulnerable 
to an action in tort. 
(2) The statutory in11nun ities which protect those engaged in industrial action frornliability 
in tort regulate liahilit) rather than the con1nHH1 law and changes in policy towards 
industrial conllict are irnplen1cnted through changes to these in1n1unities. Thus the 
Thatcher Governn1cnfs restrictions on the right to take industrial action have been 
implemented through narrowing the irnrnunitics and thus allowing an incre·tscd scope 
for the application of the con1 n1on law.3 
These two elen1ents interact to forn1 the rnodcrn law governing strikes. and the responses of 
both Parlian1ent and the judiciary have reflected developn1ents by the other. 
The development of the common law 
Since 1906 the con1n1on law has been ahle to develop on the prernise that the lirnits on a 
union's ability to strike are principally a question for Parliament to decide. although on 
occasion~ the judiciary has atten1pted to narrow the irnrnunities by giving then1 a restrictive 
interpretation. The tnost recent atten1pts. prirnarily by Lord Denning in the 1970s were 
however firm ly repulsed by the House of Lords (sec [)a vies & Freedland. 19R4b. pp. 399-405 ). 
The con11non law itself has seen a gradual broadening of the scope of liability over the years. 
the n1o t pectacular example being the "rediscovery .. of the tort ofintin1idation in Rooke.L,." 
B~rnard( 1964), a case whose only rationale seern to have been to avoid the statutory irnn1un-
1t1es. 
What the judiciary has not had to do in it. cornrnon law jurisidction is to consider to what 
extent indu trial action should forn1 a defence to an action at con1n1on law. Without statutory 
I 
1 
-
3 
Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v M cGregor Gow & Co Ltd (I YX2): Allen v Flood ( l X9H ): Quinn l ' Leathem 
(I YO I ) 
Now in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
Employment Acts lYXO and 1982. 
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intervention it is inconceivable that this issue would not have become significant over the last 
80 years. The question of defences to the common law has arisen on some occasions and in 
particular in the Crofter4 case where the industrial objects of a trade union were accepted as 
providing a defence of justification to an action in tort, although a similar defence had long 
been available where business motives were at issue. This case is however something of an 
exception and in general: "Instead of drawing a line between justifiable and unjustifiable 
pressure the con1n1on law has prefered the less controversial distinction between what is lawful 
and what is unlawful" (Elias & Ewing 1982 p. 326). 
Statutory immunities have skewed the development of the common law so that the bal-
anced law that one might have expected to see en1erge has. except in the case of conspiracy. 
failed to rnaterialise. It is this skewed development. in particular, that is of concern when the 
law is transplanted to New Zealand. The statutory immunities have meant that the judges have 
not had to face the difficult questions. 
It is interesting. by way of contrast. to compare the development of the law in the Federal 
Republic ofGern1any which is based on provisions in the Civil Code analogous to the law of 
tort. German law has never been particularly tolerant of strikes but it has nevertheless been left 
to the courts to detern1ine the parameters oflawful strike action. The solutions may be regarded 
as unduly legalistic and restrictive. but the courts have had to attempt to construct a system of 
law that takes a reasonably realistic view of industrial realities. (see Mueckenberger. 1986 on 
the Gennan systern ). 
Judicia] attiludes 
The hostility of the British judiciary to trade unions. to collective ideals and to industrial 
conflict has been described so often that it n1ay almost be regarded as a truisn1 of labour law. 
I he n1yth ofjudicial irnpartiality has been severely shaken if not destroyed by Griffith ( 1985). 
His book. which generated considerable hostility at the time came. according to Clark & 
Wedderburn. as no shock to labour lawyers. Clark & Wedderburn have also argued that: 
the traditional hostility of the working clas~ to the judiciary has in fact heen soundly based. 
The repr~ss ive judgrnen ts of the nineteenth century were matched fort he most part in the 
tw~ntieth hy .. s tartling innovations in trade union law .. and the generally negative attitudes 
toward!"! s trikes. ( 19X3. p. 166). 
The rea ~ons for this hostility seen1 generally to be attributed to two causes. the first being the 
class origins of the judges and their acceptance and support for the values and prejudices of 
that class (sec Griffith. 1<;)~5) . Several writers in recent years have atten1pted to ~how that the 
\Vhole of labour Ia\\ . both individual and collective. is affected by a particular judicial view of 
the cn1ployn1ent relationship and one that is generally hostile to workers and their organisa-
tions (sec for exarnplc Forrest. 1980: Griffiths. 1985). 
The second reason however is more con1plex and relates to the structure of British labour 
law. This argurnent also has relevance to New Zealand particularly in view of the recent 
legislative changes. The argun1ent is essentially that the statutory imn1unities place unions 
above the law and so give then1 a privileged position. This argun1ent. as Clark & Wedderburn 
point out (I <;)XJ. p. 16R ). depends on a particular view of the law that sees legislation as intruding 
on the "real" law and as restricting the legal rights ofernployers. This argun1ent is not confined 
~o Britain ~r to ll._tbou~ law .. ~a~ton A C J fo~ ex~~n1ple used this argun1ent to )ustify a restrictive 
tnterpretallon of the Conclltatton and Arbttratton Acts (Australia) in 1913.- A sin1ilar attitude 
i~ also apparent in the subrnission~ of the New Zealand Business Roundtable on the Govern-
n1ent_'s Gr~e.n Paper.~ 19X6. pp. 5J 1.41 ). In this suhrnission it is argued that a return to .. simple 
and tntelltgthlc law would solve n1any ot the prohlen1s that the Roundtable perceives in 
industrial relations. an argun1ent that not only seerns to irnply a vision ofson1e .. golden age .. of 
the cornn1on Ia\\' hut which, n1ore in1portantly. also ignores its con1plexity and its unprcdict-
a b iIi ty . · 
This argurnent contains a nun1ber of flaws both in principle and in fact. The first is the 
notion that comrnon law has some special character that places it above n1ere .. political .. (ie 
legislated) law. Such a view not only attacks the concept of democratic government but is also a 
4 Crofter Hand Wm•en !farris Tweed Co Ltd\' Veitch ( ll) I J) 
5 The A ustra/ian Tramways Employees · Association v The Prahan & Malvern Tramwav Tru:'it ( 1913) (dissenting) at p 6X7 • 
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facade for the defenu~ of a particular conception of rights that has been developed hy the 
con1 n1o n I aw cou rb. a conception founded ti nn lyon individuaL property-hased values and on 
a particular notion of freedorn of contraLt. As Kahn-Freund has said ... Nothing is rnore 
rniskading than the a1nhiguity of the word ·rreedon1· in labour relations" ( 1977. p. 12). 
The argurnentthal unions. are in sorne way above the law is also rnisleading although il has 
been raised ever si nee the original Trade l)ispu tes Act (see for exam pie l)icey. 1963. p. xI vi and 
the views of present judges quoted in Clark & Wedderhurn. 19X3, p. 170). The argurnent of 
course relate:-; to the corllrllon law. not the law as a whole. and contrary to what is asserted. this 
is not a condition uni4ue to unions. Investors of capital for example arc given in1n1unity fron1 
insolvency laws ifthey invest through a lirnited liability cornpany. The fact is that the con1n1on 
Ia\\ i:s not a perlect instrurnent and that the operation of society often re4uires particular rules 
for part iL u Ia r groups to he forn1 u la ted in the I igh t of changing social and econon1 ic conditions. 
The systern of in1n1unities in Britain is Britain's way of providing the legal basis for effective 
trade unionisn1 and for protecting the collective rights of workers. It is unfortunate perhaps 
t h at t h i s h as he e n d t > n c h y a s t? r it? s of n ega t i v e i rntll u n it i e s rat her t h a n a p o s i t i v e set o f rig h t s as 
is cornrnon for exatllpk in continental jurisdictions. The technique ernployed in Britain has 
had the unfortunah.: effect of distorting the debate on this aspect oflahour la\v and shifting its 
focus away frorn the centra l issue ofv.'hat are the legititnate rights of trade unions (see further 
Clark & Wedderburn. llJX3 and Kahn-Freund. 1977). It is of interest that. while New Zealand 
has no\\ also adopted a systcn1 ofin1n1unities. the staternent of objects for the relevant part of 
the La hour Relation 1\ct docs state the positive objeLt to .. establish that ... The right of workers 
to strike ... (i ) recognised ... (s230) 
The ho til it) generated b) these beliefs has heavily influenced subse4uent developrnents in 
Britain. Part I) thi · has heen seen in atternpts to avoid the Trade Disputes Acts or to restrict their 
application (see Clark & \Vedderbu rn. llJ!\3 and G ri ffi th 19X5) but n1ore i Ill porta n tly frorn the 
point of view of Nc\\ Zealand labour law. it is one of the principal factors that has led to the 
skewed developrnent of the cornn1on law. 
Again frorn the Ne'' Zealand perspective one nntst ask whether it is appropriate in a New 
Zealand context to accept a systcn1 of law incorporating these attitudes. 
The reception of the common law into New Zealand 
One oft he n1ore interesting aspects oft he introduction oft he eco non1 ic tut1s in to Ia bou r law 
in New Zealand was that the\ could he received with virtually no judicial ex~tTnination and 
, ~ . 
with little or no debate b\: the court~ of the issues raised above. Indeed such issues rllaV as well 
"' 
not have existed. such is the n1ytholobrY of the universality of the C01nn1on law. The assurnption 
wast hat the law was applicable. and neither courts nor counsel secn1ed prep a ru.lto argue tot he 
contrary. Even in the n1ost recent case. New Zealand Baking Trade._,. Enzployee'.._\ JUH' v General 
Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd ( 19~5 ). counsel were set: tll i ngly not prep a reJ to adva nee the a rgu-
rn en t that the co rll rn on law should not a p pI y ( p. l 2 7 per Thorp J ) . 
Although sorne early cases involving inter-union disputes did invoke the con1n1on law. the 
first rnajor atternpt to raise the econornic torts in an industrial dispute was in two cases in ll)70. 
Pete:,· Towing Sl!n'ices v Northern JUW (the li rst. and one of the vel)' few cases that went to a full 
trial) and Flett\' Northern Transport Drivers IUH1 (lhe lirst usc of an interirn injunction). The lav.· 
was consolidated a few years later in Northern Drivers JUW v Kawau Island Ferries Ltd ( 1974) 
when the Court ofAppcal upheld an interirn injunction issued against the union. In this case 
the appropriateness of the cornn1on law in the New Zealand industrial relations systen1 was 
not even debated. except for the defensive con11ncnt retlecting British views that: 
The common law right to sue in re~pect of u nju t i fi~d in tcrferencc v. ith con tractua I relations 
i not peculiar to industrial disputes: it is available in all circumstance!) and to all people 
providing the requisite interference and absence ofjustification exist. (p. 620) 
With respect. it can he said that this case is rennukable for its industrial naivety in that it 
regan.Js the union·s defence of its n1en1bers as a "n1oral" duty and contrasts that with the .. legal 
rights .. ol the en1ployer. even while seen1ingly adrnitting that such rights were a .. contrivance .. 
to reduce rnanning levels. What is equally rcrnarkabk in the first Court of Appeal case on the 
use oft he econotnic torts in an industrial dispute is the Court's view that the substantive issues 
could he addressed at a full hearing. an event which the Court should have been aware was 
n1ost unlikelv to occur. 
"' 
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Tht'-1 case confirmed the availability ofthe con1rnon law remedies in tort and heralded the 
\.\a) for an increasing ~trean1 of intcrin1 injunctions being sought to inhibit strike action. 
particu I arly in the I ast f e\\ ) ea r'-1. In the last year or ~o en1 ploye rs have realised thee ffect that an 
action for darn ages rnay h cl\ con a union and have now initiated several actions a It hough none 
have yet gone to trial. 
The effect of the law 
To justify the above criticisrn of the Court ofAppeaL it is worth outlining the impact that the 
econon1ic torts had in labour law. As will he seen. the result was a major change throughout the 
systen1 as a whole. 
(I) The legislative policy of the last~ years. that industrial disputes should be settled by a 
specialist court with a jurisdiction adapted specifically for such disputes was reversed. 
Industrial disputes henceforth were able to be litigated in two court systems. Moreover 
the dual systen1 n1eant that the most effective ren1edies from an employer viewpoint were 
avai lable in the court where. because of the nature of the usual remedy (an interim 
injunction) and the nature of the comn1on law rules, the industrial relations n1erits of the 
case were unlikely to he considered in any depth. 
(2) A new rernedy. and one that particularly favoured ernployers. was made available. a 
ren1ed) that had heen restricted in other jurisdictions for this reason (sec Anderson. 
llJ75). This resulteJ in a n1ajor change in power relationships in industrial disputes (sec 
Hughe\. 19X6 for a recent analysis of interirn injunctions). 
(3) The possi hi I i ty of a potential con tlict between the legislation and the common law arose. 
The be\t exarnple of thi s was when the Industrial Relations Act 1973 ren1oved legal 
sanction\ from a I i n1 ited range of strikes over dispu tcs of interest. Such strikes however 
aln1ost certain!) remained unlawful at cornrnon law. A second example \Vas the pro-
visions of the Com n1erce Act llJ75 to allow the Arbitral ion Court to deal with industria I 
action seriously affecting the public interest. The whole rationale of both the legis Ia tion 
anJ the polic) contained in it. that the .t\rhitration Court should deal \.Vith such disputes. 
seen1s to he rendered superfluous hy the parallel cornrnon law remedies. 
( 4) The potentia I of the con1 n1on law for a concerted ern ployer attack on not only the right to 
strike hut on the right of an effective union to exist at all hecan1e apparent. The recent 
cases cia itn i ng su hsta n tia I dan1 ages against unions clearly den1onstrate this potentia I. 
The same threat a lso exists against union officia ls. These possibilities at best can have a 
n1ajor chi IIi ng effect once the threat hecon1es apparent and at worst threaten the viabi I ity 
oft he union n1overnent. In 1986 New Zealand law was in a sin1 ilar .position to that of 
Britain before 1906. only with a n1uch n1ore developed and sophisticated con1mon law 
arsenal. 
(5) The changes hrought ahout seem to go against the trend of development particularly 
since 1951 which was one ofdefacto tolerance of strikes with a preference for solutions 
through industrial procedures. 
It was only in 19S5 in New Zealand Baking Trad<:~ £mployee:1· /UW '' General Foods Corp-
ora/ion (NZ) Ltd that the Court of Appeal finally began to consider seriously some oft he issues 
raised and at a tin1e when the proposed labour law reforrns were about to render the discussion 
redundant. The Court of Appeal in this case did recognise that issues of labour law should 
primarily he n:solved in the Arhitration Court. thus possihly limiting the trend towards seeking 
injunctions in the High Court to enforce the provisions oft he Industrial Relations Act. but was 
not prepared to go further and exclude access to the con1n1on law remedies. in particular 
interim injunctions. Given the fact that the common law had been used in this way since 1970 
the reluctance to n1ake such a rnajor change is understandable. The Court did however scen1 alin~ to the prohlerns to a much greater extent that in 1974. Cooke J fOr example ~aid: 
• 
There is some attraction in the approach that ... e\ en though a tort action has been brought 
properly before it. the High Court ~hould wash its hands of all responsibility for the time 
heing. and withhold any remedy until any case which happens to be pending in the Arbitra-
tion Court and has some link with the subject-matter of the High Court action has been 
disposed of. But that would he a radical change. having the effect of altering existing right!) 4U ite rauically . ( p. 11 X) 
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ooke .J went on to stat~ that. given that the law has stood si nee 1974. any such change wou ld 
he "u nj u t i li~d j ud ici~d legislation ... The n1ajority j udgn1en ts also leave no doubt that the H igh 
ourt's jurisdiction to issue injunctions hascd on a tort rernains intact. In deed severa l of the 
judg~s cxplicitl; stat~ that the con1n1on law powers wou ld not have heen cxd uded wi thout 
clear legislative wording (p. l l X per Cooke J a nd p. 125 per Sotne rs J ). It was also noted that 
counsel conced~d that the Court had jurisdiction (p. 127 per Thorp J ). 
Richard on J \\as how~vcr prepared to go further and hold that norn1al ly the High Court 
should decline to grant injunctions in cases concerning industrial disputes for the reason that 
the Arbitr~ttion Court h~td hecn entrusted with jurisdiction in this area and that it had the 
spcci<tl expertise to deal \\ith such disputes. lie stated: 
the dominating consider~ttion is that the underl)ing indu~trial relation!' is~ues can and 
~hould ht· <.ktermined first in the Arbitration Court. That Court ha!' the expertbe and. more 
important!). it lw~ been entrusted v.ith that re~p<>n!'ihility. (p. 1.::!1 ): 
and ~tdded 
ho\\ lll1\atisf"~IL'tory it j~ to htt\L' the dctL'rmination of thL'SL' important isSUL'S of industrial 
relation~ Ia\\ lkalt \\ ith under thL' ad\L'fS(tr) proct·sses ofthL' H igh Court which has no role in 
that reg~trd lllhkr the lndu~trial Relations Act itselfin!'lcad of leaving them to the Arbitra-
tion Court .. . An) intrusion h) the High Court into industrial rl:'lations must detL'rmine to 
some extent the legi-.,l~tli\e policies untkrl)ing the Industrial Relations Act IY73. (p. 1.::!2) 
ThejudgmenbofCook.eJ and in particularRichardsonJ goson1ewa) towards recognising 
that the u e oft he con1n1on Ia\\ docs create prohlcrns in industrial relations. Neitherjudgn1ent 
hO\\e\er que!::ltion~ the ha~ic applicahility of tht con1n1on law. only the ju~tilication for 
granting injunction~ in particular circutnstances. a point that relates to judicial discretion 
rather than suh::itanti\ e bt\\ and on I~ o\ercotnes sorne oft he problcn1s listed a hove. The tnajor 
potential prohlctn of the in1pact of an {1\\ ard of datnagcs would not he affected. 
Courts and politicians 
The discussion aho\'e lend-.; to Slll!l!e~t that the courts should have resisted the introduction 
..._._ 
of the econon1ic tort into e\\ l:ealand labour law. This point ren1ains valid. hut the extent to 
\\hich the courts could hc.t\e achie\ed thi~ i~ li1nitcd. If the courts had used thL' reasoning of 
Cooke and Richan.bon JJ in llJ / 4 the) could ha\e sc\ercly lin1ited the 4.1\ailahilit) or the 
interin1 injunction in indu~trial di~pute~ and ha\c thu~ forced the useofthe ren1cdic~ pro\ ided 
for in the Act. This \\ould ha\c been the 111o~t ~ensihle and achic\ahlt: 1neasun: and the one 
with the greate t practical in1pact in that it \\ould ha\e prcser\'~d the pre-llJ74.)tatusquo. 
Beyond thi however. it is difficult to ~ee how rnuch 1norc could have been achieved. The 
econotnic torts ha\ e general applicabilit) and to ~uggest that they not apply in Ntw Zealand is 
u n rea I ist ic. There is howe\ ~r cons ider~1 h le scope for l h c courts to act in dcvclopi ng the poss i h k 
dt: fences to an action in tort ~o as to ta k.e <~ccou n t of indus tria I rei a tions reality. For ex a tn pic the 
Lkf~nce oflegitin1ate self-interest a\ail~1bk in conspirac) could well have been generalised. 
Indeed in Pete's ToH'ing Sen'iCl!S \' .\'urthcrn IUJV Speight J did take son1e cognizance or the 
tndustri~d r~l,ttions realities in accepting a defcnL·e ofju~tilication to an action for induce1nent 
to breach or con tract. 
The dirtiLulties in the\\ a) of such a de\'eloptnent arc ho\\Cver considerable and would 
require a n1ajur ~hift in the concepts underl) ing the econotnic torts. In particular the pre-
erninence given to the lawfulness or unla\\ fulness6 of the action con1plained of as the ha~is of 
liahilit) \\Ould need to be re-evaluated and the ernpha is shifted to the rcasonahlt:nes~ of the 
action. Such a 1najor change is extrernel) unlike!) gi\ en the constraints that operate to lirnit 
judicial Ia\\ tnaking. A con1plicating factor in C\\ Zealand is that the unlawfulness would 
often he because the action was contrary to industrial relations legislation. A change as 
suggested would therefore scen1 to rnean not ahstentionisn1 by the con1n1on law. hut opposi-
tion ~o legisla_tivc policy which would be untenable. 
P~rhaps it is 1nore sensible to ask why the (iovernrnent did not act to dea l with the problen1s 
raised. The an~wers arc probahly that it would have alienated governn1en t supporters. that the 
() Lawfulness can indude a hrl!ach of contract. a tort or a breach of!'ltatute. It should not be e4uated 
with criminal conJuct (although criminal conduct is also unlawful in this context). 
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possibility of an attack on ~trikes and unions was not an unwelco~e dcvelop~e~t and pa~ly 
that the mythology of placing a group .. above the law" was suffictently convtnctng to JUStify 
tnachon. Such rca~on~ are only rational in political terms and not in terms of coherent and 
sen~ible lawmaking or indu')trial relations policy. This is particularly so given the titning of the 
events which occu rred at the sa me time as a general reforn1 oflabour law and, in some cases at 
least seemed to he in conflict with it. 
The Labour Relations Act 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 has given statutory recognition to the place of tort in labour 
law and has moved it to centre stage in industrial disputes. These reforms do ameliorate some 
of the problems that have arisen since 1970 but the problems inherent in the common law have 
not been tackled and the new structure itself proceeds on some debatable assumptions. 
Jurisdiction in tort 
The major problem the Act has solved is that of dual jurisdiction, as the Labour Court is 
given exclusive JUrisdiction over the principal economic torts where an industrial action is 
involved (~242). While a potential residual jurisdiction remains with the High Court it is 
unlikely that this will po~e problems. and especially in interlocutory proceedings the High 
Court may now be reluctant to become involved given the adequacy of the remedies available 
tn the Labour Court. The transfer of jurisdiction has not however been accompanied by any 
reform of the common lav.- 1tselfand a~ the Labour Court is unable to use its equity and good 
co nscience JUrisdiction in tort actions. the benefits of the transfer of jurisdiction may well be 
limited 1n that the speciali sed expertise oft he Labour Court may not be able to be fully utilised 
(s 279(4). In both tort action" and in applications for a compliance order the Labour Court will 
con~ist of a Judge sitting alone In the former case however the Court will be required to observe 
the accepted legal principle~ relating to the granting of interim injunctions. A proposal that the 
equity and good consc1encejuri <idiction should apply to such actions Y..as deleted by the Select 
Commtttee. The removal of thi <; provi"ton is significant as it would have allowed the Court 
considerab ly more di~cretton in deciding whether to i~sue an injunction and in particular a 
greater ability to con~ider the industrial relations issues which. although given some recogni-
tion tn some cases. tend to he seen as subsidiary to the central question of whether an 
1njunction ~ hou ld he i~sued The equity and good con~cience pro\ ision will apply to applica-
tions for compliance order~. 
The second major reform in the Act is that the situation where a strike permitted by statute 
could well he unlawful at co mmon law ha<; been remedied . The Act noY.. provides a definition 
of lawful and unlawful c;trikes (ss 233-234) and provides that no action founded on the listed 
torts may brought tn re')pect of a lawful strike 
A balance of retnedies? 
The scheme of the new Act places a n1uch greater en1pha!<!is on the econon1ic torts as a 
primary remedy in industrial disputes, a policy that would seen1 to give a statutory recognition 
to one of the inherent features in the common law, its bias towards employers. This bias is 
apparent 1n two features of the law . First the tests used in deciding whether or not an interim 
injunction should be granted tend to favour the interests of the en1ployer {sec Hughes. 1986) 
and secondly the potential lor dan1ages g1ve~ the employer a sa nction that is not available to 
union" and wh 1ch threaten " the effecti\ eness and" ia bili t) of any union involved. It is interest-
tng that the legtslation has not follo""ed th e British '\Cht;n1e of setting lirnits on the damages that 
can he awan.led whtch vary w1th the si1e ot the unton.s With sn1all and relatively poor unions. 
the threat of the personal liability of union officials in New Zealand is also a real probletn, a 
threat that would be inconceivable against an employer representative. 
The 1 ~sue of'-"' hcther a unton ca n in fact use ren1edies in tort is a third feature that should be 
con~idered . Even if an en1plo)er's action in a lockout is tortious, a debatable question, the 
7 on which \CC S1akah. 1982 
R Emplo}mentAct 1982" 16 
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availability of ren1ed ies is que tionable. The tnajor loss is 1 ikely to be wages but section 238 
provide~ \vage an~ nol payable during a lockout. seen1 ingly regardle!js of its la\vful ness 9, and in 
any case this is a lo to the worker. not the union. In the absense of real lo s neither an 
injunction nor darnages \VoulJ scern to be available. 
In practice. a union will probabl) need to rely on a con1pliancc order. an order ~'here the 
Court's full indu trial dLcretion is available. The real problen1 however relates to unlawful 
strikes where the lack of balance derives from a rigid adherence to dispute procedures which 
will usually favour the ernployer. partly because of the management values supported by the 
courts but also because such procedures usually confirn1 the employers actions until a dispute 
is resolved. Even where a union is successful the ren1edies will not usually fully restore its 
position and any SULCess rnay be negatived by the .. chilling .. effect given by the initial advan-
tage (on this effect in disrnissal cases see G las beck. l9R4. pp. 138-141 ). The essential fallacy in 
the new schen1e is to equate strikes and lockouts. The major source of en1ployer power lies in 
n1anagerial prerogative and the new Act deliberately bolsters this power by reinforcing it with 
particularly powerful ren1edies through the law of tort. 
Conclusion 
. 
This discussion has. it is hoped. demonstrated that the use of the econon1ic torts in New 
Zealand is an area that poses serious theoretical questions for the overall structure of our 
labour law. The e qu~stions go not only to the root of labour law but to the way in which the 
New Zealand courts derive the common law fron1 foreign sources. "'It is suggested that the 
techniques and pri nci pies ofconunon law tra nsplan tabili ty require judicial rc-exa m i nation in 
areas where obviously different political and social factors are at work and that this is particu-
larly so where there has been extensive legislative intervention in the area of law under 
examination. 
More in1portantly. from an immediate point of vie~'. is the suggestion that the economic 
torts have been us~d in a conscious or unconscious atten1pt to effect a major shift of power in 
New Zealand industrial relations so as to con1pel the union movement into a legalistic 
straitjacket that will seriously weaken their industrial power and consequently the protec-
tion they can give their members. The Labour Relations Act 1987 shows a n1ajor shift in 
preference towards legalistic solutions to industrial disputes accompanied by a weakening of 
the tripartite nature of the Court. There are few exan1ples in the world to indicate that such 
trends will do anything other than weaken the position of workers. 
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